Images for Episode 11: The Diem Experiment (Part Two)

Partition, 1954. The Geneva Agreement created two military regroupment zones (not countries!) separated at the 17th parallel. Elections in 1956 would reunite Vietnam.

Southern Vietnam was deeply divided by religion, language, ethnicity, and culture. In the southernmost parts of the country, the Vietnamese presence was only a few decades older than the French one.

An aerial view of Saigon, capital of the State of Vietnam (and, after 1955, the Republic of Vietnam.)

Street scene in 1950s Saigon.

The Gia Long Palace, where Diem began his tenure as Prime Minister in 1954. The French Commissioner still occupied the larger Independence Palace.

Huynh Phu So, founder of the Hoa Hao — one of the polito-religious groups that carved out its own domain in southern Vietnam during the war against France. The Viet Minh captured and executed So in 1947, damaging the group’s unity.

The spectacular Cao Dai temple in Tay Ninh. The Cao Dai were perhaps the most powerful faction in southern Vietnam in 1954, with 25,000 soldiers and over a million followers.

A group of Cao Dai soldiers. While parts of the religious militias fought against Diem’s government, many ended up joining the ranks of the Vietnamese National Army.

Le Van Vien, leader of the Binh Xuyen crime syndicate. In 1954 the syndicate controlled most government functions in Saigon and had an estimated 40,000 men under arms.

Le Grande Monde casino in Saigon. A sprawling, seedy complex, the casino burned to the ground during the fighting in 1955.

VNA Chief of Staff Nguyen Van Hinh, one of Diem’s rivals in 1954-55. For Hinh, France was the “motherland.”

US Ambassador Donald Heath (left) with the Mayor of Saigon. Heath, a career diplomat from Topeka, found himself at the center of the intrigue in Saigon during his tenure.

Map from the New York Times showing major sites of fighting during the Battle of Saigon in 1955.

VNA soldiers during the fighting in Saigon. Both the VNA and the Binh Xuyen used mortars and incendiary weapons indiscriminately during the fighting, setting neighborhoods ablaze.

VNA soldiers move to attack the Binh Xuyen.

VNA soldiers pose with the body of a Binh Xuyen foot soldier.

“Lightning Joe” Collins, legendary WW2 general and Presidential Envoy to the State of Vietnam. Collins secured direct US aid to Diem’s regime but did everything in his power to remove the premier, doubting his ability to effectively lead the country.

With his victory over the Binh Xuyen and the religious groups, Diem launched a campaign to depose Chief of State Bao Dai.

The anti-Bao Dai campaign assaulted the ex-emperor’s moral reputation while championing Diem’s. Above, a political cartoon showing Bao Dai’s sexual exploits in France.

One of the 20-foot-tall effigies of Bao Dai that popped up around Paris.

Diem rigged the referendum, “winning” 98.2% of the vote. He used the results to claim a popular mandate for his policies.

“Long live the Republic!” The premier casts his vote during the 1955 referendum.

Episode 11: The Diem Experiment (Part Two)

Stream or download it for free on iTunes, Stitcher, or Podomatic.

Back in Saigon in 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem becomes premier of a country shattered by war and partition. With reunification elections looming, Diem barely controls the grounds of his own palace. Hostile Frenchmen, religious militias, a crime syndicate, ex-emperor Bao Dai, and Diem’s own military conspire to end his rule before it can begin. Baffled American diplomats do political triage to avert a coup, urging Diem to bring his rivals to the table. But the new premier has other plans…

Inward Empire music by Stephen Spencer.

Bibliography

J Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: An Autobiography (New York: Presidio Press, 1979)

Jessica Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018)

Christopher Goscha, Vietnam: A New History (New York: Basic Books, 2016)

Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950-1963 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006)

Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983)

Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam(Cambridge, MA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2013)

Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991)

Thoughts on Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom, by Stephen Platt

I had a history prof who once suggested that US history would have turned out for the better if, at the end of the Civil War, the federal government had wiped out the entire leadership class of the Confederacy – “like the end of the Taiping Rebellion,” she added.

The what? Leaving US history aside, the Taiping rebellion (or Taiping Uprising, or Taiping Civil War) is something that never pops up in most westerners’ history education. But it should. Not only was it the bloodiest civil war in human history; western nations, as historian Stephen Platt makes clear in this book, played a major role shaping the course of the bloodshed.

I’m ignorant about the historiography for this event, so I can’t really comment on Platt’s argument. What I can comment on is his craft as a writer of historical narrative.

Platt has two keys to telling the story of the Taiping Rebellion well. First, Platt focuses his narrative of this massive bloodletting on a concise cast of characters. The two big ones are Taiping policymaker Hong Rengan and the Confucian-scholar-turned-general Zeng Guofan. Fascinating minor characters round out the cast: arrogant British diplomats, conniving American mercenaries, and delusional missionaries from everywhere. Platt’s good at connecting the sweeping themes and events with the first-hand observations of the poor bastards who had to actually slog through the misery.

His introduction of Zeng Guofan is Exhibit A for How To Introduce A Character. Watch Kurt Vonnegut’s video on the shape of stories on Youtube. Characters’ stories need shapes. They need to start somewhere and go somewhere, up or down. Zeng’s story has a crystal clear shape. He starts low: he’s old, suicidal, sick (puking, in fact), holed up in the mountains. Yet this old Confucian nerd ends up becoming the Chinese Ulysses Grant, saving a corrupt, collapsing dynasty before getting the cold shoulder and suffering a sad, obscure retirement. Make a graph for that and you have a nice clear shape.

Platt’s second key is sensory detail. Like the shapes of characters’ stories, historians aren’t always great at this, even though it’s a fundamental writing skill … remember all your English teachers who harped about “show, don’t tell?” When historians do sensory detail, it’s usually a throwaway. The weather was nice when President X took the oath of office. The eccentric inventor has unkempt hair and a twirly mustache. The historian will mention it once, in a couple of throwaway lines at the start of the book or the first time a character pops up and never mention it again. Novelists don’t do this. They know your  ape brain won’t remember a few pages later which character had a hooked nose and muttonchops, or that there was green ivy on the walls of Lady Whatever’s estate. They weave that stuff into the text, repeatedly. Readers need that. We like it.

Platt does this, and he’s good at it. (Check the author’s bio, and you’ll see he has an English degree.) Go read his description of the Anglo-French expedition up the river to Beijing. It’s awesome, and it’s because of his rich use of sensory details pulled from primary sources. The mud sucking at the marines’ boots as they storm the forts at Taku, the sparks from cooking fires illuminating the steamships’ rigging at dusk, the churning fog offshore … it’s all there, and it’s enthralling. It turns a “they went from x to y to z” narrative into a Heart of Darkness journey. Every historian should print this passage out and post it on their wall.

My one minor complaint is that Platt is sometimes a bit too enamored with dissecting articles in the British and American press. I love close reading, but these sections crop up a bit too often and go on a bit too long, gumming up the works and slowing down the narrative. It takes us out of the character-driven stories that make the rest of the book so compelling.

So yes, you should read this book if you’re interested in Chinese history, the global history of the 19th century, western involvement in Asia … But (for me anyway) the best thing about this book is that it’s an example of a kind of historical writing that few can do well. Like Barbara Tuchman, Platt cares about what these experiences looked, tasted, and smelled like. He cares about characters. He cares about tone. Books like this one make the case for writing history with a novelist’s eye.

Inward Empire summer reading list, 2019

For the curious, here’s what I’m (aspiring to) read this summer. I’ll be posting reflections on these as I go.

Kathleen Belew, Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America

Greg Grandin, The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America

Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States

Walter Lafeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America

Stephen R. Platt, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War

Clay Risen, The Crowded Hour: Theodore Roosevelt, the Rough Riders, and the Dawn of the American Century

Daniel Treuer, The Heartbeat of Wounded Knee: Native America from 1890 to the Present

and, just for kicks…

Stephen King, 11/22/63

Gaming the domino theory in Twilight Struggle

“… a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France …” – Dean Acheson

“If Southeast Asia is also swept by Communism, we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia.” – NSC 48/1

“Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly.” – President Eisenhower

Recently I’ve become totally addicted to Twilight Struggle, a Cold War-themed board game (also available in an excellent digital version). The more I play, the more impressed I am with how the game models the domino theory, one of the fundamental ideas in US foreign policy during our half-decade struggle with the Soviet Union.

American statesmen developed the domino theory in the late 1940s and early ’50s, a time when communist movements were spreading rapidly around the world. As the quotations above make clear, these statesmen believed that communists in places like Greece or China would try to spread their movements to neighboring countries and regions. A communist regime, even in a tiny country that posed no direct threat to America, could destabilize an entire region if left unchecked. Therefore, it was vital for the US to contain communism wherever it popped up.

The mechanics of Twilight Struggle simulate this theory beautifully. It’s a two-player game (one player is the US, one is the USSR), and the board is divided into nations and regions. Players take turns placing influence around the board, and can win the game by scoring points based on controlling different regions (there are other paths to victory, too, like winning the space race).

So where’s the domino theory? It comes with a brilliantly simple twist: players can only place influence in a nation where they already have it, or in neighboring nations. Just like Acheson and Ike said, influence spreads in a linear fashion from one country to the next, and players who ignore enemy moves will find an entire region slipping swiftly into their opponent’s camp.

The one exception to the linear spread of influence comes with cards, which the US and USSR take turns playing. Each card represents a real-life event from 1945-89: Nasser taking power in Egypt, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the OPEC embargo, Kruschev declaring “We Will Bury You!”, and so on. Cards allow players to break the rules of how influence spreads by suddenly opening up new fronts around the world. The USSR, for example, starts the game with no influence in Latin America or the Caribbean, but playing the “Fidel” card allows them to take control of Cuba.

The cards make for fantastic and nail-biting twists and turns in each game of TS, but they also contribute to the game’s simulation of American ideas in the era of the domino theory.  For much of the Cold War, US policy-makers tended to view communist movements in the “Third World” as fronts of a single global movement led by Moscow. This is exactly the way it is in TS: it’s the USSR that decides when Vietnam revolts, when Nasser or Fidel take power, or when communist agitation sweeps South Africa. The same goes for events that favor the US. It’s up to the players when pro-democracy agitation breaks out in Eastern Europe, for example.                                 

The card mechanic sacrifices historical accuracy while hewing more closely to the imagined dynamics of the domino theory. As the game’s creators say in their design notes:
“Twilight Struggle basically accepts all of the internal logic of the Cold War as true—even those parts of it that are demonstrably false. Therefore, the only relationships that matter in this game are those between a nation and the superpowers. The world provides a convenient chess board for US and Soviet ambitions, but all other nations are mere pawns (with perhaps the occasional bishop) in that game. Even China is abstracted down to a card that is passed between the two countries. Furthermore, not only does the domino theory work, it is a prerequisite for extending influence into a region. Historians would rightly dispute all of these assumptions, but in keeping with the design philosophy, we think they make a better game.”

In reality, Soviet and American leaders struggled to control movements around the world. Leaders from Venezuela to Vietnam had their own agendas, and popular movements (even massive ones, like the revolutions of 1989) often caught American and Soviet leaders off-guard. TS simulates this lack of total control to an extent by randomizing the cards players hold each round. It also frequently forces players into situations where they have to play a card that favors their opponent. Still, it’s the superpowers that decide when, and sometimes if, these events take place.

So while TS isn’t a great simulation of the dynamics of the real Cold War, it is stone-cold brilliant at depicting the way US policy-makers imagined the conflict. On top of that, it’s a phenomenal strategy game. A glance at the Twilight Strategy fan page shows its daunting depth. If you have even a passing interest in the Cold War or in historical strategy titles, I strongly recommend picking up a copy. And if you don’t mind dealing with a neophyte player, let me know — I’m hungry for some competition online!

Images for Episode 10: The Diem Experiment (Part One)

Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963), first President of the Republic of South Vietnam

Diem’s family. Standing at center is Ngo Dinh Kha, in whose footsteps Diem followed during his early career as a mandarin. Diem is standing, second from right.

Map of French Indochina. Note the division of Vietnam into the provinces of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina.

Empires in Asia. French Indochina was just one among many colonially occupied territories.

When France fell to Nazi Germany in 1940, Japan swooped in on its Asian colonies. Japan occupied much of Indochina until March 1945, when it finally overthrew the French regime in a coup. The short-lived Empire of Vietnam, led by Bao Dai, served as a Japanese puppet state.

Japanese policies helped provoke a brutal famine in 1944-45 which killed over a million Vietnamese. The communist Viet Minh seized the famine as a chance to win loyalty by distributing food to starving peasants.

Hanoi, September 2, 1945: After the Japanese surrender, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the creation of an independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969), leader of the DRV. In 1945, he tried and failed to incorporate Diem into his government as a representative of the non-communist nationalists. Diem would repeat a version of this story to many Americans as a way of signalling his anti-communism and independence.

In 1945, members of the OSS Deer Team parachuted into Vietnam to help the Viet Minh fight the French. They met with leaders who would later become fierce foes of the United States, including Ho Chi Minh (standing, wearing shorts) and Vo Nguyen Giap (standing, in the suit).

In 1946, France began its reconquest of Indochina by bombarding the northern port of Haiphong, leveling the city and killing an estimated 6,000 civilians.

The French soon found themselves fighting a long, bloody stalemate against the Viet Minh from 1946-54. In many ways, the First Indochina War prefigured America’s war in Vietnam.

Bao Dai, last emperor of Vietnam. Shown here at Cannes, Bao Dai desired an independent Vietnam but instead became a pawn used by the French, the Japanese, the Viet Minh, the French (again), and finally by Ngo Dinh Diem in the swirling struggle for power.

In 1950, the Viet Minh sentenced Diem to death in absentia and he fled the country. In Japan, he met Wesley Fishel, a young academic who both studied and hoped to influence anti-colonial, anti-communist Asian elites.

Diem’s brother, Bishop Ngo Dinh Thuc. Only the third Vietnamese bishop, Thuc accompanied Diem in the first part of his exile. His Catholic connections led to meetings with the Pope and Cardinal Francis Spellman.

Cardinal Francis Spellman, one of the most significant contacts Diem made during his time abroad in 1950-54.

“You know who’s going to fix you up in Vietnam?” Supreme Court Justice William O Douglas became one of Diem’s fiercest supporters, introducing him to a web of influential and powerful Americans.

Dien Bien Phu, 1954: In a last-ditch effort to secure a favorable peace in Indochina, the French military staked everything on a remote outpost in northwest Vietnam. It was a fiasco. The day after the garrison surrendered, peace talks began in Geneva.

At Geneva in 1954, delegates hammered out a settlement that temporarily divided Vietnam pending elections in 1956. As the new prime minister of a temporary country, Diem would have just two years to solidify his rule and challenge Ho Chi Minh, the most popular leader in Vietnam.

“I think that when the freedom of a man in Viet-Nam or in China is taken away from him, I think our freedom is lost a little.” At the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, President Eisenhower announced that American freedom depended on the outcome of the looming struggle in Vietnam.

Episode 10: The Diem Experiment (Part One)

Stream or download it for free on iTunes, Stitcher, or Podomatic.

For nine years at the height of the Cold War, America’s global crusade against communism rested on the shoulders of Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem. Hailed as a “miracle man” who brought the blessings of democracy and development to South Vietnam, Diem became a celebrity. But his miracles had a steep price. As his regime soaked up millions of dollars in American aid and military support, it ruthlessly suppressed its enemies, devastated villages, and failed to cope with a rising communist insurgency. As the Diem experiment began to absorb US prestige, money, and lives, Americans began to question whether their adventure in Southeast Asia was worth the cost…

Part one of this series explores Diem’s rise to power and the origins of America’s involvement in Vietnam. Diem tries to chart a “third way” between the rocks of communism and empire; French, Japanese, and Americans vie for influence; and Vietnamese factions battle for the future of their country as a hapless emperor watches.

Inward Empire music by Stephen Spencer.

Bibliography

Christopher Goscha, Vietnam: A New History (New York: Basic Books, 2016)

Max Hastings, Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy (New York: Harper, 2018)

George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: McGraw Hill, 2014)

Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950-1963 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006)

Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983)

Mark Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)

Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2013)

Edward Miller, “Vision, Power, and Agency: The Ascent of Ngo Dinh Diem, 1945-54,” in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 35 (3), pp 433-458

Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991)